The US-Kazakhstan deal to jointly explore and mine Kazakhstan’s untapped tungsten deposits came under the scanner last week after an investigation by The New York Times found that the deal was set to benefit the families and businesses associated with US President Donald Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. Signed in November 2025, the deal did not publicly disclose both families’ personal interests, the NYT report said.
As trade tensions escalated in early 2025, China expanded export controls on several critical minerals, including tungsten, resulting in shortages. This is significant for the US, especially of metals such as tungsten, known as the war metal for its high density, high melting point and hardness, with its shortage exacerbated by the closure of the last American tungsten mining facility a decade ago.
The tungsten deal is part of an MoU between Kazakhstan and the US on Cooperation in the Field of Critical Minerals, officially signed in November 2025 during Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Washington. The visit culminated in the signing of at least 30 deals with US companies worth $ 17.2 billion, including a tungsten project expected to require around $1.1 billion in investment.
Under the agreement, American company Cove Kaz Capital Group holds a 70% stake in a joint venture with the Kazakh state mining firm to develop the untapped tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan.
If successful, the mining arrangement could provide the US with an estimated 12,000 metric tonnes of tungsten per year, roughly equal to the US’ total annual tungsten imports. Thus, the deal could substantially reduce US dependence on imported tungsten.
Why is the Trump administration under scrutiny?
The deal, while economically beneficial for the US and a key part of Trump’s drive to secure critical mineral access bypassing China, has drawn scrutiny for the conflict of interest involving the White House.
In the months leading up to the signing of the deal, companies and investment firms linked with Trump’s and Lutnick’s families reportedly positioned themselves to benefit from the signing of the deal, the NYT report said. While the tungsten deal was signed in November 2025, the details were finalised two months prior at a meeting between Lutnick and Tokayev at the St Regis Hotel, with Trump joining by phone to persuade the Kazakh president to greenlight the project, according to the NYT.
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Notably, mere days before the deal, Skyline Builders announced its merger with Cove Kaz Capital Group, under which the combined company would operate as Kaz Resources Inc.
Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC holds a 70% controlling stake in Severniy Katpar LLP, the joint venture that owns the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits, while Kazakhstan’s state-owned Tau-Ken Samruk retained the remaining 30%.
The NYT reported that Trump’s sons, Donald Jr. and Eric, participated in the investment through Dominari Securities and a Special Purpose Vehicle that took a stake in Skyline Builders, which in turn acquired a 20% stake in Cove Kaz Capital shortly before the tungsten deal was signed.
Similarly, Cantor Fitzgerald, controlled by Lutnick’s family and overseen by his sons Brandon and Kyle, helped one of the lead investors raise $210 million for a related entity and reportedly earned millions of dollars in fees, the NYT said.
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Ahead of Kaz Resources’ public listing this year, it came to light that the Trump administration had already issued preliminary commitments worth up to $1.6 billion for it to operate the tungsten deal.
However, Kaz Resources is merely the latest example of deals that have featured conflict-of-interest concerns involving the Trump family.
At least 14 companies are actively seeking close to $9 billion in federal funding on critical mineral deals, with some involvement of both families, the NYT reported.
As part of the Trump administration’s push to secure critical minerals through federal funding to mining firms, it has approved roughly $19 billion in federal funding to around 60 critical minerals projects worldwide, according to the NYT. Roughly half of this funding has gone to companies linked to the Trump and Lutnick families, NYT said.
What does Kazakhstan stand to gain?
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With the rise in militarisation worldwide, Kazakhstan is increasingly positioning itself as a supplier of critical minerals by capitalising on countries seeking to diversify away from China.
Tungsten is a critical mineral used in the manufacturing of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile warheads, armour-piercing ammunition, and fighter jets, making it vital for defence industries. American investment could strengthen Kazakhstan’s economic and strategic clout in the region with its projected capacity to produce and process at least 25 of the 60 commodities on the US critical minerals list, making it an important player in the global rare earth and critical minerals market.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has been working with the European Union (EU) and other European countries, such as Switzerland, as well as Turkey, South Korea and other West Asian countries as part of its multi-vector foreign policy to diversify away from Russia and China.
That President Trump has dispensed with the traditional human rights and democracy narrative in pursuit of a more transactional foreign policy has further helped Kazakhstan, which struggled to build good ties with past American administrations. Accordingly, Astana has sought to deepen ties with the Trump administration by announcing major business deals, joining the Abraham Accords, becoming a founding member of the Board of Peace, and leading a high-level Central Asian delegation to Washington.
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Accordingly, Astana has sought to deepen ties with the Trump administration by announcing major business deals, symbolically joining the Abraham Accords, becoming a founding member of the Board of Peace, and leading a high-level Central Asian delegation to Washington.
At the same time, Kazakhstan continues to pursue its long-standing “multi-vector” foreign policy, balancing relations with the United States, Russia, China and other partners.
The author is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, JNU.